We examine the effect that an initial 5-star Morningstar mutual fund rating has on future fund performance, strategy, risk-taking, expenses and portfolio turnover. Using a sample of diversified domestic equity funds from 1990's we find that 3-years after a fund has received its initial 5-star rating, fund performance severely falls off. This result is robust across different performance measures and different samples of funds. We also find that after receiving their initial 5-star rating, the risk levels of funds rise and that the funds are not able to load on momentum stocks as well as they did before receiving the 5-star rating. These results suggest that funds, to some degree, alter their portfolios after receiving a 5-star rating and that investors should be very wary about using the 5-star rating as a signal of future 3-year performance. 
Introduction
How does the average U.S. investor discern a winning mutual fund from another? If one were to glance at mutual fund advertisements in the popular press the likely answer would be Morningstar star ratings. For many well-known funds, the only hint of past winning performance in their ads is the Morningstar star rating. Indeed, in 2001 Indeed, in -2002 , fund companies such as American Century, Dreyfus, Fidelity, Franklin Resources, Northern Funds, and Strong Funds all ran advertisements that emphasized stars rather than their own return history. 1 Evidence from academic research also indicates that investors care greatly about star ratings. Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) find that the Morningstar star rating itself has a significant effect on fund flows. They find that a fund's initial 5-star rating, produces inflows of 53 percent above the normal flow. Oppositely, funds with rating downgrades experience significant outflows beyond what would normally be expected.
Given the importance of the Morningstar ratings to mutual fund investors this paper asks the following question: What happens to fund performance, strategy, risk-taking, expenses and portfolio turnover just after a fund receives its first 5-star rating? These are an important questions to ask because we can look at two of the more deeply investigated issues in mutual fund research-performance persistence and tournament effects-using a definition of a winning fund that is consistent with what the average investor would also use. For example, consider the issue of performance persistence in mutual funds. While there is a large literature on performance persistence, e.g., Brown and Goetzmann (1995) , Carhart (1997) , Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996) , Goetzmann and Ibotson (1995) , Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993) , Khorana (2001) , all these papers define winning funds by standard performance measures such as single or multi-index alphas. Furthermore, these papers typically use performance at the end of the year to define winning funds. Alternatively, our use of the initial 5-star rating allows us to utilize the same definition of a wining fund as investors and to pinpoint the exact time when an investor would know it. The same can be said of tournament effects. Papers by Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) and Busse (2001) define winning funds during the middle of the year using standard performance metrics and then examine the strategies of these winning funds during the later part of the year. The idea is that funds are competing to be the best performing funds not at the middle of the year but at the end when performance histories are calculated and used in marketing efforts. In this paper, we can use the 5-star rating, the performance metric that many mutual fund companies actually advertise with, as the definition of a winning fund and then see how and if the funds alter their strategy in an attempt to retain the 5-star rating.
Finally, it should be noted here in the introduction that this paper is not the first to examine the performance effects of Morningstar ratings.
2 Blake and Morey (2000) have investigated the predictive qualities of the entire Morningstar rating system. The difference here is that this paper only examines those cases where we can define a fund as receiving its first 5-star rating so as to measure the effects of suddenly becoming a winning fund. This approach allows for an easy to use break point to examine changes in performance, strategy, risk-taking, expenses and portfolio turnover surrounding the issuance of the 5-star rating. Conversely, Blake and Morey only examine performance.
The rest of the paper is organized in five sections. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 contains the methodology. Section 4 presents all of our results and Section 5 concludes the paper.
Data
To obtain fund data we use 33 Morningstar mutual fund quarterly data disks from July 1993 till July 2001. Our reason for beginning with the July 1993 disk is that this is the first data disk that provides inception date information for the funds. Hence, it is the first time we can accurately determine the age of the fund. We stop with the July 2001 disk since Morningstar data disks after this time require much higher fees to easily download all their data.
Using these disks our process of collecting the data was the following. Starting with the July 1993 data disk 3 we select all funds, regardless of style, that had inception dates of no earlier than April 1, 1990 and had 5-star overall Morningstar ratings. Since all these funds have just slightly more than 3-years of return data and because Morningstar only rates funds with at least 3-years of return history, the July 1993 data disk represents the first time that the selected funds are listed as having a 5-star overall rating. Then for each of the subsequent quarterly data disks through July 1998 (data up until June 30, 1998) we repeat this process making sure that the funds selected from each subsequent disk have not been rated as 5-stars before. For example, for the October 1993 disk, we select all funds on the disk with inception dates of April 1, 1990 or later and had an overall 5-star rating as of the October 1993 disk. Any funds that were also selected when using the July 1993 disk were deleted from the sample.
Hence, at the end of this process we have a list of funds that have just received their first 5-star rating. Of course, the sample is somewhat biased in that we are only taking relatively young funds. Indeed, the oldest possible fund in our sample would be just over eight years old at the time it was initially given a 5-star rating (April 1, 1990 -June 30, 1998 . It would of course be preferably to examine older funds as well, but since we cannot determine whether or not these older funds have received a 5-star before we examine them, we are forced to exclude them from the sample.
Finally, to make the sample more manageable we then choose only those funds that were listed as diversified domestic equity funds. These are funds that had styles of Aggressive Growth, Equity-Income, Growth, Growth-Income, and Small Company. This left a sample of 273 total funds.
For each of the 273 funds we then collected the fund returns for three years before and three years after the fund first became a 5-star fund. 4 For example for a fund which was found to receive its first 5-star rating on the January 1998 disk (as of December 31, 1997), we examined the returns from January 1, 1995-December 31, 1997 (in-sample) and the returns from January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2000 (out-of-sample).
While many of the 273 funds went through name changes that required effort in matching the listed 5-star fund to its out-of-sample 3-year returns, only nine of the 273 funds did not have the full 3-years of out-of-sample data. Hence, there is very little surviorship bias in our data. The relatively low number is probably due to the fact that these were deemed to be very successful funds (5-star funds) only 3-years before. Of these nine funds, seven were mergers and two were liquidations. For the merger funds we simply used the returns of the fund up until it merged and then filled in the remaining monthly returns using the takeover fund's returns. For the two 4 These returns are adjusted for management expenses such as 12b-1 fees but are not adjusted for loads.
liquidated funds (Manning and Napier Small Cap and UAM ICM Equity) all the out-of-sample return data was used until the fund liquidated. Hence, for these two funds there were less than 36 months of out-of-sample returns. 
Methodology
To be consistent with other fund performance studies, and because different performance metrics can produce different results, we use four different performance metrics from the existing performance literature to measure out-of-sample performance: the Fama-French-Momentum 4-factor alpha (see Fama and French (1993) , Jagadeesh and Titman (1993) and Carhart (1997) ), the Elton-Gruber and Blake 4-factor alpha (1996), a Sharpe ratio, and a single-index alpha.
Specifically, the four following model specifications (in the order described above) are examined,
where, it R is the fund monthly return in excess of the monthly T-Bill; 
Results

A. Performance Change surrounding the first instance of a 5-star Rating
We investigate the impact of the first instance of a 5-star rating by examining the mean and median performance levels for funds before and after the issuance of the 5-star rating. In addition we also examine the changes in levels that occurred from the 3-year in-sample period to the 3-year out-of-sample period. Moreover, we examined four different samples of funds:
i) All 273 funds found in the sample (All).
ii) All funds with the exception of index funds so as to only represent actively managed portfolios (NO Index).
iii) All actively managed portfolios that did not have multiple share classes (NO Index and NO MSC). We used this particular sample since Morningstar treated each share class of a fund as an independent fund for purposes of assigning a star rating. That is, a fund which had three share classes, would have been considered three different funds according to Morningstar. 8 This caused a problem in our sample because a number of funds had other share classes that preceded the inception date for the fund listed in our sample. For example, consider the Alliance Growth and Income Fund C. This fund had an inception date of May 1993. On the April 1998 Morningstar disk we found that this fund for the first 6 time became a 5-star fund. Hence, the fund was included in our sample. However, the A share class of this same fund, had an inception date of July 1932. Obviously since this fund may have had a 5-star rating before and due to the age of the fund, it is suspect if the first instance of a 5-star rating for the C share class would lead to major changes in performance, management, etc. Hence, for these reasons we excluded any funds that had multiple share classes from this sample.
iv) All actively managed portfolios that did not have multiple share classes and were defined as Growth funds (NO Index, NO MSC and only GROWTH). We used this sample so as to deal with any possible style effects.
The results are shown in Table 1 (panels A and B). They show strong evidence that performance falls off dramatically after a fund receives its first 5-star rating. In all four samples, and for all four performance metrics we see a steep drop off in performance whether using the mean or median levels. Indeed, for the sample which excludes only index funds we see that at least 80 percent of the funds show a drop off in performance no matter the performance metric used. These results show clearly that what most investor interpret as strong performance, i.e., a 5-star Morningstar rating, does not persist 3-years out-of-sample.
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B. Performance Attribution Analysis
In an effort to examine if fund managers alter their portfolio strategies surrounding the first instance of 5-star rating, we examined the estimates of the Fama-French-Momentum four-factor model before and after the issuance of the initial 5-star rating. The results are reported in Table 2 .
Note that because the findings were similar across the four samples reported in Table 1 , we only report the results on the NO Index sample.
The results show that managers significantly increase their loadings on HML, the difference in returns between high and low book-to-market equity portfolios, after receiving a 5-star rating. This result suggests that fund managers move towards higher value stocks in attempt to maintain their high ratings.
The results also show that funds did a poorer job of loading on momentum stocks (UMD) after receiving their initial 5-star rating. This inability to identify and invest in these momentum stocks, i.e., stocks that have done very well in the recent past, could very well be part of the explanation for the poorer performance after receiving the 5-star rating. In the literature, Carhart (1997), Wermers (1999) and Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) find that the momentum factor is an important determinant of whether winning performance persists.
C. Portfolio Risk Analysis
In this section we examine the risk taking behavior before and after a fund receives its initial 5-star rating. Specifically, we examine the levels and changes in levels of a fund's total risk (sigma-the standard deviation of monthly returns) and systematic risk (beta-from the single index model) during the 3-years before and after a fund receives its initial 5-star rating. The results are reported in Table 3 and are again only for the NO Index sample. The results for other samples were very similar to those reported and are available upon request.
The results show that after a fund has received its initial 5-star rating, the risk level of the average fund increases quite substantially. Although there are some doubts as to whether sigma and beta appropriately measure risk (see Fama and French (1993) ), we find that both sigma and beta rise significantly after a fund receives the initial 5-star rating.
At first glance these results seem to contradict the mutual fund tournament literature.
Specifically, research by Brown, Harlow and Starks (1996) has found that poor performing funds will attempt to increase their risk more than winning funds in an attempt to "catch-up" while the winning funds will take more conservative positions in order to "lock-in" their ranking. Hence,
given that a 5-star rating is one of the most visible signs of a winning fund to investors, we would expect funds that have just received their first 5-star rating to be somewhat more conservative in order to maintain these high ratings. However, the story does not end there. More recent research suggests that our results showing increased risk by winning funds (as measured by the 5-star rating) may be not be that surprising at all. For example, Chavalier and Ellison (1997) found a positive correlation between past fund performance and increases in tracking error volatility in the subsequent quarter. Moreover, Busse (2001) has found that funds that are ranked above the median fund in their category increase total risk more than below median funds. Finally, recent work by Taylor (2003) has theoretically modeled how winning funds may be more willing to gamble than poor performing funds as the winning fund manager gambles in expectation that losing fund manager will gamble as well. In any event, the results of Table 3 indicate that these newly minted 5-star funds are increasing risk substantially as compared to what they did before the 5-star rating.
D. Expense Ratio and Turnover Analysis
Carhart (1997) notes that one of the most important factors in terms of predicting future performance is that of expenses. Specifically, funds with low expenses seem to perform slightly better than funds with higher expenses. Given this, we wanted to see if the falloff in performance in Table 1 was a result of funds increasing their expenses and or turnover after receiving a 5-star fund. Table 4 presents mean and median expense ratio and turnover during the time when funds received their initial 5-star rating and then one, two and three years afterwards. The results show weak evidence that the expense ratios of these funds actually slightly decline after receiving their initial 5-star rating. This decline is consistent with economies of scale coming from an increase in the average fund size.
In terms of portfolio turnover, the results suggest a very small decrease in portfolio turnover after a fund receives a 5-star fund (however the decrease is not significant). For example we find that the mean turnover rate goes from 94.70 percent when the fund first receives its initial 5-star rating to 85.48 percent three years after. These results are very consistent with Khorana (2001) who finds that past top performing funds show a slight decline in turnover after the time they are defined as top performing funds.
In sum, both the expenses and turnover seems to slightly decline or remain at stable levels after the fund receives the 5-star rating. These results provide evidence that increases in expenses and/or turnover are not the cause of the falloff in performance that we see in Table 1 .
Conclusions
Our results in Table 1 indicating that the there is a sharp drop off in performance after a fund receives its first 5-star Morningstar rating, are very consistent with the literature that shows that winning performance does not persist. Brown and Goetzmann (1995) , Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996) and Carhart (1997) all find that while winning performance may persist for one-year, in longer out-of-sample periods, such as three-years, performance severely drops off. The difference with this paper is that we are actually examining performance persistence using what a typical investor might use to deem a fund a winning fund. As to why there is such a fall off in performance there are several possible explanations.
First, while we find that that expenses and portfolio turnover do not change much, it does seem that the risk levels of 5-star funds rise and that the funds are not able to load on momentum stocks as well as they did before receiving the 5-stars. These results are consistent with other findings of Busse (2001) who finds that winning funds do increase risk levels. Hence, it may be that winning funds in an attempt to remain winning funds take risks and strategies that actually cause their performance to suffer.
Second, our results may simply be due to efficient markets. That is, the past performance of a fund that has just acquired its initial 5-star rating may simply be a matter of luck. Hence, given enough time most winning funds will revert to the mean in terms of performance. In studies of the entire Morningstar rating system, Blake and Morey (2000) find results that concur with these. Specifically they find that the average 3-year out-of-sample performance of funds with 5-star ratings is similar to that of 3-star rated (median rated) funds.
Third and most interesting, as mentioned in the introduction, recent research by Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) has found that the Morningstar rating itself has a very powerful effect on fund flows. They find for example, that an initial 5-star rating yields, on average, a sevenmonth abnormal flow of 53 percent above the normal expected inflow. Hence, one possible explanation for our results is that once a fund receives its initial 5-star rating, the fund receives so much new money that the fund becomes unwidely to manage and hence cannot perform to the same level as before receiving the 5-star rating. While this explanation is quite compelling, the literature is rather mixed on how fund flows affect future performance. Warther (1995) provides evidence to suggest that there is a positive relation between flows and subsequent performance whereas other such as Jain and Wu (2000) show that large inflows do not allow for persistence in performance. However, given the strong results of Del Guercio and Tkac and this paper, there may indeed be a negative relationship between large fund inflows and future performance. This is a subject for future research. The table presents the mean and median coefficient values for the 36-month period before and the 36-month period after a fund receives its first 5-star rating from Morningstar. A falling fund is a fund that has fallen in terms of performance from the pre-5-star period to the post-5-star period. RMRF is the excess return on the value weighted market proxy, SMB is the difference in returns across small and big stock portfolios controlling for the same weighted average book-to-market equity in the two portfolios, HML is the difference in returns between high and low book-to-market equity portfolios, and UMB is a momentum factor that is the average return on two high prior return portfolios minus the average return on two low prior return portfolios. The sample of funds used corresponds to the no index sample in Table 1 This table shows the mean and median expense ratios and turnover (expressed in %) for funds receiving their first 5-star rating from Morningstar. Time 0 refers to the time when the fund received its initial 5-star rating. The expense ratio is defined as the percentage of fund assets paid for operating expenses and management fees, including 12b-1 fees, administrative fees, and all other asset-based costs incurred by the fund, except brokerage costs. The turnover ratio is a measure of the fund's trading activity which is computed by taking the lesser of purchases or sales (excluding all securities with maturities of less than one year) and dividing by average monthly net assets. The sample of funds used corresponds to the No Index sample in Table 1 Mean Change in Turnover -4.75 -13.11 -11.21 Median Change in Turnover 0.00 -5.00 -3.00 ***,**, * indicate that the mean (median) change coefficient is statistically significant at the one, five and ten percent level based on a paired t-test (Wilcoxon sign rank test).
